PHRAGMENT: PHilosophical Reflections on A Grounded

This is the conclusion of the five part series on Jinn and the Shayateen. We discuss our close yet hidden companions known as the 'Qareen' in the Islamic narrative. This series is based on my chapter in Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, edited by McCraw and Arp (Routledge, 2017).

This is part 1 of a five part series on the Jinn and the Shayateen.  We discuss the nature of the Jinn, the difference between Jinn and Shayateen, and their moral status and role in relation to human beings the Islamic narrative.   This series is based on my chapter in Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, edited by McCraw and Arp (Routledge, 2017).

This is the second part of a five part series on the Jinn and Shayateen. In this episode we discuss the creation of Adam, the origin of Shaytan (Satan), and the nature of the satanic in Islamic narrative. This series is based on my chapter in Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, edited by McCraw and Arp (Routledge, 2017).

This is the third part of the five part series on Jinn and the Shayateen. We discuss the meaning of the satanic 'whisper' in the Islamic narrative. This series is based on my chapter in Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, edited by McCraw and Arp (Routledge, 2017).

This is the fourth part of the five part series on Jinn and the Shayateen. We discuss the relationship between jinn and humans in the Islamic narrative. This series is based on my chapter in Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, edited by McCraw and Arp (Routledge, 2017).

This is the first to two episodes exploring Ibn Rushd's accusation against Ghazali and the Ash'ari school of conceiving of God as an 'eternal man' by way of unsound analogies between the temporal and eternal. Here, we focus on at issue in relation to the divine attributes of life and will. 

This the second part of our exploration of Ibn Rushd's accusation that Ghazali and the Ash'aris use unsound analogies between the temporal and eternal in their understand of God's attributes. Here, we focus on Ghazali's contention that God's knowledge is distinct from His power because it conforms to, and is not the cause of its object as Ibn Rushd holds. 

This is the conclusion of our our part series on the seventeenth discussion of Ghazali's Incoherence.  I will sum up my understanding of his position, and how it meets legitimate ontological and epistemological concerns of the falasifa while avoiding the problematic theological implications of their position. We will discuss some other concerns of Ghazali's that are evident in the text, reflect on their current iterations in our modern context, and bring out some additional questions raised by his argument and which call for further reflection.   

This is the third of our four part series on the seventeenth discussion of Ghazal's Incoherence, and where I dive right into making the case that his "two approaches" to what we can call the "problem of miracles" are not (or need not be) mutually exclusive theories of natural order or natural causality and divine action.  To that end, I propose a concept of the 'essential nature' of a thing which, I suggest, Ghazali had (or should have had) in mind in the course of the argument, and which would satisfy Ibn Rushd's legitimate ontological concerns. 

This is the second episode of our four-part series on the 17th discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers. Here we dive further into the debate between Ghazali, the 'falasifa,' and Ibn Rushd over miracles and natural causality. This takes us through a number of interesting issues, including the possibility and nature of divine will, the problem of induction and the possibility of knowledge of future contingencies, and the very nature of knowledge itself. Finally we examine Ghazali's explanation of how miracles, and the pervasiveness of God's power, is compatible with natural order.   

In this episode, we dive into the 17th discussion of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's Incoherence of the Philosophers. This is the chapter for which he has been accused by some of "destroying the Muslim mind." The central question is whether and how we can understand God acting on the world in general, and the possibility of miracles more specifically, in a way which is compatible with the notion of an orderly nature and / or the possibility of natural science.  This is the first part of a four part series on this subject, which will take a close look at Ghazali's arguments with the 'falasifa' as well as some of Ibn Rushd's key responses in his Incoherence of the Incoherence; explain some important elements of the philosophical context of the debate, and explore some its interesting implications and open questions.  

Al-Ghazali has been blamed for singlehandedly stunting the intellectual development of the Muslims. Recent scholarship has found this rather strong accusation to be a false one, and based in part on superficial understandings, not only of his influence but also his intentions in writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. So what were his intentions in writing it, and how do they bear on the prospect of an intellectually developed Muslim? In this episode, I read and discuss Ghazali's own account of that, as he explains it in the book's introductions.     

Belief in Divine Providence in the most basic and literal sense, is just the belief that God provides.  In the context of philosophy of history, it is typically understood as the notion that history itself somehow is, or manifests, the unfolding of God's 'plan.' In this episode we will discuss this concept as it developed in the Christian tradition, drawing mainly from the work of Etienne Gilson (The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy), and consider it in relation to both its Islamic and modern iterations.     

This is the last of a four part series on Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the African Arab intellectual widely considered to be the founder of sociology and the philosophy of history. We will be reading from the introduction of his Muqaddimah ("Prolegomena"), and discussing his insights on historical methodology, some epistemological problems they raise, and their continued relevance in contemporary life. In part four, we examine Ibn Khaldun’s elaboration on why the historian must be aware of the significance of changes in cultural conditions over time, culminating in his statement that, when such changes occur, it is ‘as if the whole world changes.’ This leaves us, again, with the question of whether the scientific history Ibn Khaldun aspires to requires a vantage point immune to such change, and whether (and how) that is possible.      

This is the third of a four part series on Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the African Arab intellectual widely considered to be the founder of sociology and the philosophy of history. We will be reading from the introduction of his Muqaddimah ("Prolegomena"), and discussing his insights on historical methodology, some epistemological problems they raise, and their continued relevance in contemporary life. In part three, we examine Ibn Khaldun’s assertion that history should be treated as a branch of philosophy, in the context of the ‘philosophy’ as understood by classical Islamic ‘falasifa’ such as al-Farabi. We discuss his critique of historians who do not apply the ‘yardstick of philosophy,’ and the prospect of distinguishing historical cultural conditions from unchanging principles of nature, knowledge of which he claims is required to understand history. 

This is the second of a four part series on Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the African Arab intellectual widely considered to be the founder of sociology and the philosophy of history. We will be reading from the introduction of his Muqaddimah ("Prolegomena"), and discussing his insights on historical methodology, some epistemological problems they raise, and their continued relevance in contemporary life. In part two, we examine Ibn Khaldun’s assertion that scientific knowledge of the nature of civilization enables a critical investigation of history by which we can discern the true from false reports, and a potential problem raised by the question whether our ‘scientific’ knowledge itself ultimately depends on history.  

This is the first of a four part series on Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the African Arab intellectual widely considered to be the founder of sociology and the philosophy of history. We will be reading from the introduction of his Muqaddimah ("Prolegomena"), and discussing his insights on historical methodology, some epistemological problems they raise, and their continued relevance in contemporary life. In part one, we examine his discussion of the causes of inaccuracy and falsehood in historical accounts, including the partisanship of historians, uncritical reliance on transmitted reports, ignorance of the cultural and historical context in which reported events took place, and propaganda.      

How is trust in God compatible with using natural science to guide our practical decisions? How is it compatible with upholding our ethical obligations toward others?   Is there always only one science and set of 'scientific facts,' or are there sometimes diverse yet genuinely scientific opinions? Is the general public capable of judging between different scientific opinions on what to do in times of crisis? If not, should we (if we could) strictly limit discussion of scientific disagreements to qualified experts, and present the general public with a single narrative, as if it were unanimously agreed upon as the only genuinely scientific viewpoint?